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This chapter culminates the analysis in this volume by examining 
two closely related questions.1 The fi rst of these is posed in the title: Do 
performance measures based on short-run outcomes predict long-run 
program impacts? If they do, then performance management systems 
like those in JTPA and WIA will provide incentives that enhance the 
economic effi ciency of program operations. Put differently, if existing 
performance measures predict long-term impacts, then their use pro-
vides some benefi ts to weigh against the costs documented in earlier 
chapters. The second question concerns the effi ciency costs of cream 
skimming induced by the performance standards. As noted in Chapter 
3, depending on the relationship between the performance measures 
and net program impacts, cream skimming may be effi ciency increas-
ing (a positive relationship), effi ciency decreasing (a negative relation-
ship), or neutral (no relationship).
We address these questions in two different ways. The two analyses 
build on different identifying assumptions but both utilize the experi-
mental data from the National JTPA Study (NJS) introduced in Chapter 
6. The two analyses represent different ways of dealing with the fact 
that, absent additional assumptions, experimental data do not provide 
impacts for individuals, only average impacts for groups. Both strate-
gies have important limitations, which we discuss in detail later on in 
the chapter.
Both methods yield the same basic fi ndings. First, the short-run 
labor market outcomes commonly used as performance measures do 
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not predict long-run impacts. Indeed, in some cases we fi nd a perverse 
relationship, indicating that the performance measures actually provide 
an incentive for program staff to move away from, rather than toward, 
economic effi ciency. Second, we fi nd little evidence of an effi ciency 
cost associated with cream skimming; if anything, it may provide a 
small effi ciency gain.
NJS DATA
We use data gathered as part of the NJS, an experimental evaluation 
of the JTPA program described in Chapters 2 and 4, for the analyses in 
this chapter. The experiment was conducted at 16 of the more than 600 
JTPA training centers (which we will also refer to as sites). Table 9.1 
lists the sites that volunteered to participate in the experiment and pro-
vides some descriptive statistics. Columns one through three indicate 
the racial/ethnic composition of the adult participant population during 
the study, while the fourth column indicates adult participants’ average 
years of schooling. The fi fth and sixth columns display unemployment 
and poverty rates. 
The fi nal three columns indicate the fraction of participants 
assigned to each of the three experimental treatment streams, based on 
the services recommended for them prior to random assignment. The 
classroom training in occupational skills (CT-OS) stream includes indi-
viduals who were recommended to receive CT-OS and possibly other 
services not including subsidized on-the-job training (OJT) at private 
fi rms. The OJT treatment stream includes individuals recommended to 
receive OJT and possibly other services not including CT-OS. The other 
services stream is a residual category that, with only a few exceptions, 
includes individuals not recommended to receive either CT-OS or OJT. 
As illustrated in Exhibit 3.17 of Orr et al. (1996), individuals in the 
CT-OS stream usually received classroom training whether in the form 
of basic education or CT-OS or both. Those in the OJT stream often did 
not enroll; when they did enroll they tended to receive OJT or, some-
what less often, job search assistance. Individuals in the “other” treat-
ment stream received a wide variety of services.
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Table 9.1  Descriptive Statistics for the 16 Sites in the National JTPA Study







Fraction of participants assigned to:







Corpus Christi, TX 23.3 10.4 65.5 11.2 10.2 13.4 34.3 51.5 14.1
Cedar Rapids, IA 87.8 7.6 1.3 11.6 3.6 6.0 60.0 35.4 4.6
Coosa Valley, GA 82.1 17.1 0.6 10.7 6.5 10.7 36.1 38.1 25.7
Heartland of FL 50.2 45.7 2.8 11.4 8.5 11.3 28.9 27.1 44.0
Fort Wayne, IN 72.3 23.7 2.8 11.5 4.7 5.9 6.4 66.2 27.3
Jersey City, NJ 6.3 68.6 20.3 11.5 7.3 18.9 46.0 35.7 18.3
Jackson, MS 13.9 85.5 0.3 12.2 6.1 12.8 57.9 35.5 6.6
Larimer County, CO 77.9 1.8 17.0 12.2 6.5 5.9 29.6 7.1 63.3
Decatur, IL 68.1 31.9 0.0 11.8 9.2 7.8 14.4 79.1 6.5
Northwest MN 81.3 1.8 10.9 11.4 8.0 11.1 25.6 74.0 0.4
Butte, MT 86.6 0.3 5.0 11.7 6.8 7.5 26.6 40.1 33.3
Omaha, NE 38.6 53.4 4.2 11.7 4.3 6.7 77.4 18.9 3.7
Marion, OH 95.6 2.3 0.9 11.3 7.0 7.2 48.8 41.8 9.4
Oakland, CA 8.0 68.3 6.8 12.4 6.8 16.0 49.6 7.9 42.6
Providence, RI 33.6 33.9 24.6 11.3 3.8 12.1 32.3 13.0 54.7
Springfi eld, MO 96.1 1.8 0.0 11.9 5.5 10.1 17.7 74.6 7.7
SOURCE: Race/ethnicity and years of schooling for adult participants come from calculations by the authors using the National JTPA 
Study data. Race/ethnicity categories do not necessarily sum to one due to the omission of “other.” Unemployment rates are from Orr et 
al. (1996, Exhibit 3.3) and are unweighted annual averages for 1987–1989. Poverty rates come from Orr et al. (1996, Exhibit 3.2) and 
are for 1979. The treatment stream recommendation fractions for adults come from Kemple, Doolittle, and Wallace (1993, Table 7.1). 
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The site selection strategy for the evaluation excluded sites with 
small enrollments for cost reasons. Attempts to gain external validity 
among larger sites by selecting sites at random failed due to high refusal 
rates, as described by Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Hotz (1992). 
Without random site selection, external validity in the strict sense 
clearly fails. At the same time, Table 9.1 makes clear that the 16 sites 
represent a diverse mix in terms of participant demographics, local eco-
nomic conditions, and service mix. Doolittle and Traeger (1990, Section 
5) compare the 16 experimental sites to the population of all JTPA sites 
and fi nd that, on average, the two groups look much alike. In our view, 
these patterns make our results suggestive, rather than either defi nitive 
or irrelevant, when generalized to the JTPA program more broadly. 
At the experimental centers, persons who applied to and were 
accepted into the program were randomly assigned to either a treatment 
group allowed access to JTPA services or to a control group denied 
access to JTPA services for the next 18 months. A short survey at the 
time of random assignment collected background information on demo-
graphic characteristics, educational attainment, work history, past train-
ing receipt, current and past transfer program participation, and fam-
ily income and composition. This survey was self-administered with 
assistance from program staff; it achieved a response rate well over 90 
percent as well as only modest item nonresponse conditional on survey 
response. We use variables from this baseline survey to defi ne our sub-
groups (and for the participant descriptive statistics in Table 9.1). 
In addition, follow-up surveys collected information on employ-
ment and earnings around 18 months after random assignment and, for a 
random subsample, at around 30 months after random assignment. The 
response rates for the two surveys were 83 and 77 percent, respectively, 
with little difference between the experimental treatment and control 
groups (see Appendix A of Orr et al. [1994]). Both the program and the 
experimental analysis divided participants into four groups based on 
age and sex: adult males and females aged 22 and above and male and 
female out-of-school youth aged 16–21 (the NJS did not examine the 
component of JTPA serving in-school youth). We examine only adult 
males and females in this chapter due to the small samples available for 
the two youth groups.
We use the data on wages, earnings, and employment from the follow-
up surveys to construct the performance measures and outcome vari-
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ables. Our outcome variables consist of earnings and employment for 
18 or 30 months after random assignment. For our analyses using per-
centiles, we use all observations with valid values of earnings over the 
18 months after random assignment. For the analyses using subgroup 
variation in experimental impacts, we trim the top 1 percent of the earn-
ings values. The employment variables measure the fraction of months 
employed, where we code an individual as employed in a month if they 
have positive earnings in that month.
The JTPA performance measures we analyze are hourly wage and 
employment at termination from the program and weekly earnings and 
employment 13 weeks after termination. In most states at this time, pro-
gram staff members obtained these outcomes via telephone surveys of 
participants. We do not have access to the telephone survey data for our 
sample and instead use program termination dates from JTPA admin-
istrative data combined with data from the follow-up surveys on job 
spells to construct the performance measures. Because program admin-
istrators did not necessarily contact participants on the exact date of 
termination or follow-up (and to allow for some measurement error in 
the timing of the self-reported job spells), we count all job spells within 
30 days on either side of the termination date (or 13 weeks after termi-
nation, as appropriate) in constructing the performance measures. We 
measure employment based on the presence or absence of a job spell 
within this window. For the wage measure, we use the highest hourly 
wage within the window for persons holding more than one job. For 
the earnings measure, we take the average weekly earnings on all jobs 
over the 61-day window. Following the defi nition of the corresponding 
offi cial performance measures, we calculate hourly wages and weekly 
earnings for employed persons only. 
For more information on the NJS experimental data, see the offi cial 
impact reports in Bloom et al. (1997) and Orr et al. (1996), the offi cial 
implementation reports in Doolittle and Traeger (1990) and Kemple, 
Doolittle, and Wallace (1993), and related papers on the design and the 
data by Hotz (1992), Smith (1997), Kornfeld and Bloom (1999), and 
Heckman and Smith (2000). For discussions of interpretational issues 
see Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), Heckman, Smith, and Taber 
(1998) and Heckman et al. (2000).
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ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS STRATEGIES: 
NOTATION AND MOTIVATION
Ideally, we would like to relate individual program impacts to indi-
vidual values of the performance measures. Unfortunately, as discussed 
in, e.g., Heckman (1992); Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); 
Heckman and Smith (1998); and Djebbari and Smith (2008), without 
additional assumptions, even experimental data do not allow us to gen-
erate individual-level impact estimates. 
To consider this issue more carefully, we return to the notation 
defi ned in Chapter 3. Recall that 1,a iY  denotes a labor market outcome 
for person i in some period a given treatment, where the 1 superscript 
denotes treatment. Similarly, 0,a iY  denotes a labor market outcome in 
the same period given no treatment, implying that the impact for indi-
vidual i in period a equals 1 0, , ,a i a i a iY Y   . In this chapter, we distin-
guish between two periods: the short run, denoted by s, and the long 
run, denoted by l. Both periods begin at the time the individual decides 
to participate or not. In terms of this notation, we would ideally like to 
relate 1,s iY  and ,l i . Finally, recall that S denotes the set of individuals 
treated. 
Experimental data consist of the marginal distributions of out-
comes in the treated and untreated states, that is, 0( )af Y  and
1( )af Y . 
Experimental data to not identify the joint distribution of outcomes, 
0 1( , )a af Y Y , and therefore do not identify individual impacts. Experi-
mental data do identify mean impacts for subgroups of individuals 
defi ned by characteristics not affected by the treatment (which usually 
means those observed prior to random assignment). Letting g denote 
some particular subgroup (such as those with exactly 12 years of 
schooling) out of a set G, we can construct the impact estimate for the 
subgroup by taking a mean difference between the treated and untreated 
units in subgroup g. More formally, we estimate the subgroup impact 
1 0
, ( | ) ( | )a g a aE Y G g E Y G g      by replacing the conditional ex-
pectations with the corresponding sample means.2
The next two sections describe the strategies we employ to deal 
with the lack of individual impact estimates. The fi rst strategy imposes 
additional, nonexperimental, assumptions on the data that allow us to 
construct individual impact estimates. The second strategy relies solely 
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on subgroup variation in the experimental impacts and, as such, requires 
no additional assumptions.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS STRATEGIES: 
RANK PRESERVATION
Our fi rst econometric strategy builds on the assumption of rank 
preservation outlined in Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997).3 We 
assume that the joint distribution of treated and untreated outcomes 
takes a very simple form: the counterfactual for each quantile of the 
treated outcome distribution consists of the corresponding quantile of 
the untreated outcome distribution. Thus, for example, the counterfac-
tual outcome for the median treated person consists of the outcome of 
the median untreated person. Note that under this assumption, cream 
skimming on 0aY  implies the same choices as cream skimming on 
1
aY . We 
can think of the simple world defi ned by the rank preservation assump-
tion as a “one factor” world in which those who do well in the treated 
state also do well in the untreated state and those who do poorly in the 
treated state also do poorly in the untreated state.
This assumption may seem quite unusual, but in fact it nests the 
widely (though often implicitly) used common effect model in which 
,a i a   . In the common effect world, the treatment has the same 
effect on all participants. In this world, the treated outcome distribution 
has the same shape as the untreated outcome distribution but its location 
differs by the common treatment effect. For example, if the untreated 
outcomes have a normal distribution with mean 100 and variance 20, 
and the common treatment effect equals 10, then the treated outcomes 
have a normal distribution with mean 110 and variance 20. Moreover, 
in the common effect world, quantiles of the treated and untreated out-
come distributions again form counterfactuals for one another. The rank 
preservation assumption relaxes the assumption of an equal treatment 
effect for all participants while keeping the link between the quantiles 
of the two outcome distributions. It therefore nests the common effect 
model as a special case.
More formally, following Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997), 
if each individual has the same rank in the distributions of 0aY and 
1
aY , 
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then we can associate a 0aY with each 
1
aY ; continuity of the two distribu-
tions implies a unique association. The assumptions of rank preserva-
tion plus continuity allow us to construct a as a function of 0aY  (or, 
what is the same thing, of 1aY ). We operationalize this idea by taking 
percentile differences across the treated and untreated outcome distri-
butions.4 Let 0, jaY  denote the jth percentile of the 0aY  distribution, with 
1, j
aY  the corresponding percentile in the 
1
aY  distribution. Thus, we esti-
mate 0, 1, 0,( )j j ja a a aY Y Y   . Our data include mass points at zero earn-
ings in both the treated and untreated distributions. For the correspond-
ing percentiles we simply assign an impact of zero; because all of the 
outcomes equal zero in the lower percentiles of the two distributions, 
order does not matter. Thus, the lack of a unique association in this part 
of the distribution poses no problems in our application.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS STRATEGIES: SUBGROUP 
VARIATION IN EXPERIMENTAL IMPACTS
Our second identifi cation strategy relies solely on the exogenous 
variation in treatment status induced by the experiment. As noted 
above, as a result of random assignment, we can construct unbiased 
mean impact estimates for subgroups defi ned by variables observed 
prior to random assignment. 
To implement this strategy, we form 43 subgroups based on the 
following characteristics measured at the time of random assignment: 
race, age, education, marital status, time since most recent employment, 
receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC—the pre-
decessor to the current Temporary Aid to Needy Families program), 
receipt of Food Stamps, and training center. Individuals with complete 
data belong to eight subgroups, while we include those with incomplete 
data in as many subgroups as their data allow. Using a regression frame-
work, we construct mean-difference experimental impact estimates for 
each subgroup.5 We adjust these estimates by dividing through by the 
fraction enrolled in each subgroup to refl ect the fact that a substantial 
fraction of persons (41 percent of adult males and 37 percent of adult 
females) in the treatment group dropped out and did not participate in 
JTPA.6 We construct the subgroup average performance measures by 
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simply averaging the individual performance measures over the mem-
bers in each subgroup. 
RESULTS BASED ON THE RANK PRESERVATION 
ASSUMPTION
Figures 9.1 and 9.2 present estimates of 0,( )ja aY constructed under 
the rank preservation assumption. Self-reported earnings in the 18 
months after random assignment constitute the outcome variable. The 
horizontal axis in each fi gure indicates percentiles of the treated and 
untreated (i.e., control) outcome distributions. The vertical axis indi-
cates the difference in outcomes at each percentile. 
We begin with the estimates for adult women in Figure 9.1, for 
whom the sample size is the largest. First, we observe zero impacts 
through the 20th percentile. This region corresponds to persons with 
zero earnings in the 18 months after random assignment in both the 
treated and untreated states under the rank preservation assumption. 
Second, we observe a relatively constant positive treatment effect of 
around $800 over the interval from the 20th to the 90th percentile. 
Third, we note a discernible increase in the estimated impact in the 
fi nal decile. Assuming roughly equal costs among participants at dif-
ferent percentiles, the pattern in Figure 9.1 suggests that cream skim-
ming beyond the 20th percentile has little effect on the economic effi -
ciency of JTPA. However, a policy of targeting services at the bottom 
two deciles entails clear costs. To the extent that the untreated outcome 
proxies for the performance measures, Figure 9.1 suggests only a very 
modest (and very nonlinear) positive relationship between the perfor-
mance measures and the impacts. 
Figure 9.2 for adult men tells a similar tale. We observe a relatively 
fl at relationship over the range from the 10th to the 50th percentile, after 
which it dips and then rises again. Given the wide standard errors (and 
the smaller region of zero impacts at the lowest percentiles) we can say 
with some (but not overwhelming) confi dence that cream skimming, 
in regard to adult males, also likely has little effect, either positive or 
negative, on effi ciency. And, to the extent that the untreated outcomes 
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proxy for the performance measures, we see little relationship between 
the two for adult males under the rank preservation assumption.
RESULTS BASED ON SUBGROUP VARIATION: UNIVARIATE 
In this section we examine the experimental impact estimates for 
subgroups defi ned by individual baseline characteristics. Put differ-
ently, we examine the correlation between predictors of 1aY  and impacts 
conditional on values of those predictors. Caseworkers may use specifi c 
variables, such as labor force status, to help them forecast short-run 
outcomes as part of a strategy to select as participants individuals likely 
to do well on the performance measures. Moreover, the relationship 
between such characteristics and a  is of interest in its own right.
Tables 9.2 and 9.3 summarize subgroup estimates of the impact of 
JTPA on the earnings and employment of adult females and adult males 
in the JTPA experiment, respectively. The fi rst column in each table lists 
the values of each subgroup variable. Columns two through fi ve pre-
sent impacts on earnings in the 18 and 30 months after random assign-
ment and on the fraction of months employed in the 18 and 30 months 
after random assignment. Note that the samples differ for the 18 and 
30 month outcomes due to survey nonresponse in the second follow-up 
survey. We also present p-values from tests of the null of equal impacts 
among the subgroups defi ned by each variable. We present subgroup 
impacts conditional on labor force status (employed, unemployed, and 
out of the labor force), highest grade completed, AFDC receipt and 
month of last employment (if any), all measured at the time of random 
assignment. All of these variables predict the level of the 18-month and 
30-month outcomes for participants.
For adult females, we reject the null of equal impacts among sub-
groups in 4 of the 16 possible cases. Two of the rejections (at the 5 per-
cent level) occur for employment over 18 months and earnings over 30 
months conditional on AFDC receipt, with larger impacts in each case 
for women receiving AFDC. As AFDC receipt is negatively related to 
1
aY , this fi nding suggests that cream skimming may be somewhat inef-
fi cient for adult women. The other two rejections occur for earnings and 
employment over 30 months conditional on month of last employment. 
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Table 9.2  Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Females
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Labor force status
P-value for equal impacts 0.3919 0.5745 0.4715 0.2286
Employed 1,223.78 1,487.38 0.0017 −0.0158
(651.64) (2,461.08) (0.0135) (0.0168)
Unemployed 507.42 428.84 0.0112 0.0184
(507.92) (1,715.10) (0.0112) (0.0128)
Out of the labor force 1,543.72 3,274.29 0.0274 0.0184
(601.48) (2,089.21) (0.0160) (0.0188)
Education
P-value for equal impacts 0.6890 0.4641 0.8149 0.4646
Highest grade completed 
< 10
1,029.22 −2227.56 0.0135 0.0175
(643.40) (2,577.38) (0.0164) (0.0182)
Highest grade completed 
10–11
1,341.37 3,088.46 0.0289 0.0246
(592.06) (2,179.51) (0.0147) (0.0171)
Highest grade completed 
12
460.29 1503.23 0.0129 −0.0053
(469.73) (1,711.16) (0.0109) (0.0129)
Highest grade completed 
> 12
971.20 795.14 0.0115 0.0209
(816.54) (2,997.34) (0.0172) (0.0211)
AFDC receipt
P-value for equal impacts 0.7224 0.0371 0.0277 0.2607
Not receiving AFDC 712.26 −947.01 0.0028 0.0026
(392.05) (1,462.17) (0.0087) (0.0105)
Receiving AFDC 924.57 3,624.35 0.0343 0.0211
(451.07) (1,631.02) (0.0113) (0.0127)
Recent employment
P-value for equal impacts 0.8614 0.0492 0.5708 0.0139
Currently employed 1,104.08 396.24 0.0138 0.0056
(721.42) (2,851.27) (0.0151) (0.0197)
Last employed 0–2 
months ago
594.01 979.22 0.0099 0.0060
(713.69) (2,485.38) (0.0161) (0.0181)
Last employed 3–5 
months ago
171.44 −7,677.17 −0.0063 −0.0589
(953.91) (3,485.31) (0.0199) (0.0220)
Last employed 6–8 
months ago
1,874.38 975.22 0.0451 0.0502
(1,175.53) (3,721.12) (0.0263) (0.0305)
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We have trouble interpreting these estimates, which do not reveal any 
obvious systematic pattern.
Considering the estimates in Table 9.2 more broadly, we see three 
patterns. First, we lack the data to precisely estimate most of the sub-
group impacts. Second, the point estimates often suggest very differ-
ent impacts by subgroup. Third, the subgroup impact estimates often 
change substantially between 18 and 30 months. Taken together, these 
fi ndings leave us with a lot of uncertainty about the effi ciency effects of 
cream skimming. At the same time, it seems unlikely that caseworkers, 
who receive little feedback about the long-run labor market outcomes 
of participants at either the individual or aggregate level, have more 
information about these patterns than we do. Thus, any efforts to select 
participants based on these observed variables will likely have little 
systematic relationship to impacts, a conclusion quite consistent with 
the fi nding in Bell and Orr (2002) and Lechner and Smith (2007) that 
caseworkers cannot predict impacts.
For adult males, statistically signifi cant differences in impacts 
among subgroups defi ned by our set of characteristics emerge only 
once, for impacts on 18-month earnings conditional on labor force sta-
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Recent employment
Last employed 9–11 
months ago
1,679.73 5,244.59 0.0310 0.0636
(1,311.91) (4,437.63) (0.0305) (0.0382)
Last employed ≥ 12 
months ago
1,304.36 4,919.73 0.0341 0.0347
(587.15) (2,020.46) (0.0155) (0.0180)
Never employed 610.59 −2,490.44 0.0335 −0.0059
(609.42) (2,736.46) (0.0168) (0.0191)
NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Esti-
mates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts 
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported 
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations 
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for 
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors appear in parentheses.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
Table 9.2  (continued)
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Table 9.3  Experimental Impact Estimates by Subgroup, Adult Males
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Labor force status
P-value for equal impacts 0.0407 0.3469 0.2679 0.6517
Employed 2,839.24 6,328.20 0.0300 0.0005
(1,145.51) (4,143.22) (0.0166) (0.0194)
Unemployed 718.84 3,021.68 0.0056 0.0180
(710.16) (2,339.51) (0.0105) (0.0125)
Out of the labor force −2,193.85 −2,725.72 −0.0163 0.0289
(1,658.81) (4,693.28) (0.0262) (0.0281)
Education
P-value for equal impacts 0.6077 0.7939 0.9587 0.7206
Highest grade completed 
< 10
680.26 1,713.46 0.0114 0.0403
(1,193.62) (3,935.62) (0.0203) (0.0225)
Highest grade completed 
10–11
−64.77 −270.18 0.0120 0.0134
(1,020.79) (3,516.67) (0.0163) (0.0188)
Highest grade completed 
12
1,438.13 552.70 0.0030 0.0105
(793.68) (2,729.26) (0.0119) (0.0141)
Highest grade completed 
> 12
−92.00 4,886.81 0.0116 0.0201
(1,238.21) (4,155.34) (0.0172) (0.0221)
AFDC receipt
P-value for equal impacts 0.5948 0.5794 0.3813 0.6678
Not receiving AFDC 722.73 2,933.22 0.0122 0.0161
(556.43) (1,810.58) (0.0085) (0.0099)
Receiving AFDC −232.18 −274.82 −0.0132 0.0306
(1,706.56) (5,495.50) (0.0278) (0.0322)
Recent employment
P-value for equal impacts 0.5995 0.6193 0.9112 0.7010
Currently employed 2,668.20 3,053.96 0.0176 −0.0134
(1,230.61) (4,174.11) (0.0178) (0.0212)
Last employed 0–2 
months ago
816.36 6,126.54 0.0168 0.0205
(1,091.14) (3,637.23) (0.0152) (0.0180)
Last employed 3–5 
months ago
−425.61 1,248.64 0.0037 0.0119
(1,162.99) (3,794.83) (0.0176) (0.0209)
Last employed 6–8 
months ago
−5.65 −790.27 −0.0135 0.0312
(1,824.51) (5,453.91) (0.0256) (0.0296)
chapter9.indd   286 4/27/2011   9:54:37 AM
Do Short-Run Performance Measures Predict Long-Run Impacts?   287
tus. In this case, the largest impacts appear for men employed at the time 
of random assignment. Employment at random assignment correlates 
positively with 1aY . As for adult women, the insignifi cant coeffi cients 
vary substantially among subgroups, and exhibit patterns that are diffi -
cult to interpret, such as nonmonotonicity as a function of months since 
last employment or years of schooling, as well as substantial changes 
from 18 to 30 months. Combined with the general lack of statistically 
signifi cant subgroup impacts, the pattern of estimates represents weak 
evidence of at most a modest effi ciency gain to cream skimming for 
adult males. For both men and women, of course, the costs of service 
provision may vary among subgroups as well, so that the net impacts 
may differ in either direction from the gross impacts reported here.
Other results in the literature that make use of the experimental data 
from the NJS echo the fi ndings in Tables 9.2 and 9.3. Bloom et al. (1993, 
Exhibits 4.15 and 5.14) present subgroup impact estimates on earnings 
in the 18 months after random assignment. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 
5.8 and 5.9) present similar estimates for 30-month earnings using a 
somewhat different earnings measure than we use here.7 Both consider 
a different set of subgroups than we do. Only a couple of signifi cant 
NOTE: Monthly earnings are based on self-reports with top 1 percent trimming. Esti-
mates are adjusted for program dropouts in the treatment group. Earnings impacts 
are calculated using all sample members with valid observations for self-reported 
monthly earnings during each period. The sample includes 4,886 valid observations 
for the 18-month period after random assignment and 1,147 valid observations for 
the 30-month period after random assignment. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors appear in parentheses.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
Subgroup Earnings impacts ($) Employment impacts
18 months 30 months 18 months 30 months
Recent employment
Last employed 9–11 
months ago
1,191.58 −4,914.81 0.0163 0.0098
(2,328.58) (7,657.02) (0.0384) (0.0478)
Last employed ≥ 12 
months ago
525.44 3,885.63 0.0284 0.0475
(1,333.79) (4,722.38) (0.0224) (0.0257)
Never employed −799.52 −6,377.68 0.0017 0.0145
(1,606.04) (6,242.27) (0.0295) (0.0319)
Table 9.3  (continued)
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subgroup impacts appear at 18 months. At 30 months, the only signifi -
cant subgroup differences found by Orr et al. (1996) among adults are 
for adult men, where men with a spouse present have higher impacts.8 
Overall, the absence of many statistically signifi cant subgroup differ-
ences, combined with the pattern of point estimates, makes the fi ndings 
in Bloom et al. (1993) and Orr et al. (1996) consistent with our own 
fi ndings. There exists little evidence of substantial effi ciency gains or 
losses from picking participants on the basis of X and, even if such 
potential gains or losses exist, neither we nor, in all probability, the 
caseworkers, have any real knowledge of them. 
RESULTS BASED ON SUBGROUP VARIATION IN 
EXPERIMENTAL IMPACTS: REGRESSION
We now turn to our multivariate regression analysis of the relation-
ship between subgroup impacts and subgroup average performance 
measures. Table 9.4 presents estimates of the relationship between 
experimental impacts on earnings and on employment and various per-
formance measures based on short-term labor market outcomes. We 
estimate separate regressions for each outcome (earnings and employ-
ment for 18 and 30 months) and for each performance measure.9  
The four columns of estimates in Table 9.4 correspond to cumulated 
earnings and employment impacts for 18 and 30 months after random 
assignment. Each cell in the table presents the regression coeffi cient 
associated with the column’s dependent variable and the row’s inde-
pendent variable, the estimated (robust) standard error of the coeffi -
cient, the p-value from a test of the null hypothesis that the population 
coeffi cient equals zero and the R2 for the regression. We do not report 
the estimated constant terms from the regressions to reduce clutter. For 
example, the fi rst row of the fi rst column reveals that a regression of 
subgroup earnings impacts for the 18 months after random assignment 
on the subgroup average hourly wage at termination from the JTPA pro-
gram yields an estimated coeffi cient of −$577.61 on the hourly wage, 
with a standard error of $304.00, a p-value of 0.0645, and an overall R2 
of 0.0809. 
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Four striking fi ndings emerge from Table 9.4. First, and most 
important, we fi nd many negative relationships between short-run per-
formance indicators and experimental impact estimates at the subgroup 
level. In many cases the short-run outcome measures utilized in the 
JTPA performance standards system have a perverse relationship with 
the longer-run earnings and employment impacts that constitute the 
program’s goals. The only evidence supporting the effi cacy of short-
run outcome measures comes from the employment-based performance 
measures for adult men, which are positive and statistically signifi cant 
at the 10 percent level in three cases. These same performance measures 
have negative coeffi cients in seven out of eight cases for adult women. 
Second, we fi nd low R2 values throughout. The short-term perfor-
mance measures have only a very weak relationship with impacts on 
earnings and employment for 18 or 30 months. Third, moving from 
performance measures based on outcomes at termination from the pro-
gram to longer-term measures based on outcomes three months after 
termination usually weakens the relationship between the performance 
measure and program impacts. In particular, the R2 values nearly always 
decline and the estimated coeffi cients sometimes become less positive 
or more negative. Fourth, the performance measures often do worse (in 
terms of the fraction of variance explained) at predicting impacts for 
30 months after random assignment than at predicting impacts for 18 
months after random assignment. This indicates that the low predictive 
power of the performance measures in our analysis does not result from 
reductions in work activity during the periods of program participation 
(the so-called lock-in effect), which for some participants constitutes a 
nontrivial chunk of the 18 months after random assignment. 
In sum, the regression analysis yields three clear conclusions. First, 
short-run performance measures do a very poor job of predicting long-
run impacts, in terms of explained variation. In general, performance 
measures only weakly related to program goals accomplish little as 
rewards and punishments often get assigned based on noise. In terms 
of the discussion in Chapter 3, the JTPA performance measures do not 
solve the principal-agent problem by providing incentives for impact 
maximization. Moreover, they clearly fail to provide cheap, quick prox-
ies for econometric impact evaluations. Second, the point estimates 
often suggest a negative relationship, indicating that the JTPA perfor-
mance standards system may have provided an incentive for reduced 
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Table 9.4  Relationship between ∆ and Y1  in JTPA: Earnings and Employment Impacts
Earnings impact ($) measured over: Employment impact measured over:
Performance standard measure
18 months after 
random assignment
30 months after 
random assignment
18 months after  
random assignment
30 months after 
random assignment
Adult females
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NOTE: The actual JTPA performance measures are defi ned as follows: “Hourly wage at placement” is the average wage at program 
termination for employed adults. “Weekly earnings at follow-up” are the average weekly wage of adults employed 13 weeks after pro-
gram termination. “Employment rate at termination” is the fraction of adults employed at program termination. “Employment rate at 
follow-up” is the fraction of adults who were employed 13 weeks after program termination. In our analysis, employment rates were 
calculated based on the presence or absence of a job spell within 30 days before or after each reference date (termination or follow-
up). Hourly wages were calculated based on the highest reported hourly wage for all job spells reported within 30 days before or after 
each reference date. Weekly earnings were calculated by averaging the product of hourly wages and hours worked per week across all 
reported job spells within 30 days before or after each reference date weighted by the fraction of the 61-day window spanned by each 
job spell. 
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002).
Adult males
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effi ciency. Third, we can say little about the effi ciency cost to cream 
skimming other than that the data do not make a loud statement in either 
direction given our sample size and subgroups.
PUTTING THE RESULTS IN CONTEXT
The fi ndings presented in this chapter do not represent an anomaly 
in the literature, but rather tell much the same story as the other studies 
that perform similar analyses. Table 9.5 summarizes six other studies 
that examine the relationship between performance standards measures 
based on short-run outcome levels and long-run program impacts; these 
six studies include, to the best of our knowledge, all of the published 
studies of this type as well as two that appeared only as government 
reports.10 For each study, the table provides the citation, the particu-
lar employment and training program considered, the data used for the 
analysis, the impact measure used (for example, earnings from 18 to 
36 months after random assignment), the impact estimator used (for 
example, random assignment), the particular performance measures 
considered (for example, employment at termination), and the fi ndings.
Four studies, Gay and Borus (1980), Cragg (1997), Barnow (1999), 
and Burghardt and Schochet (2001), reach conclusions very similar to 
our own. The other two studies, Friedlander (1988) and Zornitsky et 
al. (1988), obtain more mixed results. The most positive of the studies, 
Zornitsky et al. (1988), examines the AFDC Homemaker/Home Health 
Aide Demonstration, which provided a homogeneous treatment to rela-
tively homogeneous clients. This program represents a very different 
context from multitreatment programs serving heterogeneous popula-
tions such as JTPA and WIA. Moreover, this demonstration program, 
with its focus on the skills for a particular high-demand occupation, 
most likely did not lead to much postprogram human capital investment. 
As noted in Chapter 3, such investments tend to weaken the relationship 
between the short-run performance measures and long-run impacts. 
Taken together, these studies generally support our fi nding from the 
JTPA data that performance standards based on short-run outcome lev-
els likely do little to encourage the provision of services to those who 
benefi t most from them in employment and training programs. 
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LIMITATIONS OF OUR ANALYSIS
The analysis in this chapter focuses on one particular caseworker 
response to the imposition of a performance management system based 
on short-run outcomes: changes in who gets accepted into the pro-
gram. In a model similar to the one presented in Chapter 3, casework-
ers attempt to forecast both impacts and performance outcomes using 
the information available at the time of the acceptance decisions. In 
the case of the subgroup regression analysis, our interpretation assumes 
that caseworkers use observed characteristics to forecast both impacts 
and performance outcomes and then act on those forecasts. The per-
formance management system causes them to put more weight onto 
the performance outcome forecast in making decisions about whom to 
serve. 
Two important assumptions lurk in the shadows behind this inter-
pretation. First, we must assume that mean impacts and mean perfor-
mance at the subgroup level do not differ between a world with per-
formance standards and a world without them. This assumption could 
easily fail if, for example, service allocations conditional on character-
istics change with the introduction of performance management.11 Sec-
ond, we must also assume that mean impacts and mean performance at 
the subgroup level do not differ between applicants and participants.12 
Caseworkers see and make choices about applicants, while we have 
data only on individuals accepted into the program, as indicated by their 
reaching random assignment. The data from the Corpus Christi site in 
the NJS considered in Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1996) indicate that 
only about one-third of applicants reach random assignment, which 
leaves plenty of scope for differences between applicants and partici-
pants in the relationship that we estimate. 
A fi nal and very important limitation resides in the inability of our 
analyses in this chapter (or indeed, in this book) to say anything about 
the effect of the performance standards on the technical effi ciency (or 
productivity) of the local JTPA training centers. By way of illustration, 
consider the subgroup regression analysis and suppose that having a 
performance standards system increases both the mental and physical 
effort levels (more “working smart” and less on-the-job leisure) of pro-
gram staff. Suppose that this extra effort increases the impact of the 
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Table 9.5  Evidence on the Correlation Between Y1 and ∆ from 
Several Studies






and Training Act 
(MDTA), Job 
Opportunities 
in the Business 








from December 1968 
to June 1970 and 
matched (on age, race, 
city, and sometimes 
neighborhood) 
comparison 
sample of eligible 
nonparticipants.
Impact on Social 
Security earnings in 
1973 (from 18 to 36 
months after program 
exit). 
Zornitsky 
et al. (1988) 
AFDC Homemaker-
Home Health Aid 
Demonstration 
Volunteers in the 
seven states in which 
the demonstration 
projects were 
conducted. To be 
eligible, volunteers 
had to have been on 
AFDC continuously 
for at least 90 days. 
Mean monthly 
earnings in the 32 
months after random 
assignment and mean 
monthly combined 
AFDC and food 
stamp benefi ts in 





to-work programs in 




recipients of AFDC 
(varies across 
programs).  Data 
collected as part of 
MDRC’s experimental 




(from UI earnings 
records) and welfare 
receipt (from 
administrative data).
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Employment in quarter after 
program, before-after (four 
quarters before to one quarter 
after) changes in weeks 
worked, weeks not in the 
labor force, wage rate, hours 
worked, income, amount of 
unemployment insurance 
received, and amount of 
public assistance received. 
No measure has a consistent, 
positive, and statistically 
signifi cant relationship to 
the estimated impacts across 
subgroups and programs. 
The before-after measures, 
particularly weeks worked 
and wages, do much better 
than employment in the 
quarter after the program.
Experimental impact 
estimates 
Employment and wages at 
termination. Employment 
and welfare receipt three and 
six months after termination. 
Mean weekly earnings 
and welfare benefi ts in the 
three and six month periods 
after termination. These 
measures are examined both 
adjusted and not adjusted for 
observable factors including 
trainee demographics and 
welfare and employment 
histories and local labor 
markets. 
All measures have the correct 
sign on their correlation 
with earnings impacts, 
whether adjusted or not. The 
employment and earnings 
measures are all statistically 
signifi cant (or close to it). 
The welfare measures are 
correctly correlated with 
welfare impacts but the 
employment measures are 
not unless adjusted. The 
measures at three and six 
months do better than those 
at termination, but there is 





quarterly earnings) in 
quarters 2 and 3 (short term) 
or quarters 4 to 6 (long term) 
after random assignment.  
Welfare receipt in quarter 
3 (short-term) or quarter 6 
(long-term) after random  
assignment.
Employment measure is 
positively correlated with 
earnings gains but not welfare 
savings for most programs.  
Welfare indicator is always 
positively correlated with 
earnings impacts, but rarely 
signifi cantly so.  It is not 
related to welfare savings.  
Long-term performance 
measures do little better (and 
sometimes worse) than short-
term measures.
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Study Program  Data  Measure of impact 
Cragg 
(1997)




JTPA (1987–89) NJS Earnings and hours 
worked in month 






Job Corps Experimental data 




receipt of education 
or training, weeks 
of education or 
training, hours per 
week of education or 
training, receipt of a 
high school diploma 
or GED, receipt of a 
vocational certifi cate, 
earnings, and being 
arrested.  All are 
measured over the 
48 months following 
random assignment.
Table 9.5  (continued)
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 Impact estimator Performance measures  Findings
Generalized bivariate 




Fraction of time spent 
working since leaving school 
in the preprogram period.  
This variable is strongly 
correlated with postprogram 
employment levels.
Negative relationship 
between work experience 





of earnings and hours worked 
in month 10 after random 
assignment.
At best a weak relationship 
between performance 




Job Corps centers divided 
into three groups: high 
performers, medium 
performers, and low 
performers based on their 
overall performance rankings 
in program years 1994, 1995, 
and 1996.  High and low 
centers were in the top and 
bottom third nationally in all 
three years, respectively. 
No systematic relationship 
between the performance 
groups and the experimental 
impact estimates.
SOURCE: Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002); Barnow and Smith (2004).
chapter9.indd   297 4/27/2011   9:54:38 AM
298   Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith
program for all participants by $100 over 18 months. In our regres-
sions of estimated subgroup mean impacts on estimated subgroup mean 
performance levels, this extra $100 shows up in the intercept, not in 
the slope coeffi cient, with the result that we do not interpret it as the 
effect of the performance standards. To our knowledge, the only evi-
dence of the effect of performance management on technical effi ciency 
in the context of an active labor market program comes from the United 
Kingdom, where Burgess et al. (2004) fi nd evidence of such effects for 
small work teams but not for large ones. This lack of evidence comes 
as a real surprise, given that the literature on performance incentives in 
private fi rms, well summarized in Prendergast (1999), focuses almost 
exclusively on productivity effects.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents several empirical analyses designed to address 
the questions laid out in the introduction: First, do short-run perfor-
mance measures predict long-run impacts? Second, what are the effi -
ciency costs of cream skimming? We describe the identifying assump-
tions underlying our analyses as well as their limitations. 
Taken as a whole, our empirical analysis reaches two important 
conclusions. First, the limited evidence we have suggests that what-
ever cream skimming occurs in JTPA produces only modest effi ciency 
gains or losses. In other words, though we must acknowledge the noisi-
ness of the evidence, our results suggest at most a modest effi ciency 
cost associated with eschewing cream skimming in favor of a focus on 
the most hard-to-serve among those applying to the program. Second, 
the JTPA performance standards do not promote effi ciency because the 
short-run outcomes they rely on have essentially a zero correlation with 
long-run impacts on employment and earnings. This surprising result 
comports with the fi ndings in several other studies that have estimated 
this relationship. 
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Notes
 1. This chapter presents results from Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (2002) and bor-
rows in places from their text.
 2. In addition to simple mean differences, we can also use regression analysis to 
obtain experimental impact estimates. Doing so may generate more precise esti-
mates if the exogenous conditioning variables included in the regression soak up 
a lot of the residual variance.
 3. This concept has a variety of names in the published literature, including “per-
fect positive dependence” and “perfect positive rank correlation.” We use “rank 
preservation” here because it is short and seems to be gaining ground in the most 
recent literature. 
 4. See, e.g., Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997); Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes 
(2008); and Djebbari and Smith (2008) for more details on this estimator, includ-
ing the construction of the standard errors.
 5. This correction amounts to using the simple Wald instrumental variables estimator 
with treatment status as an instrument for enrollment. See, e.g., the discussions in 
Heckman, Smith, and Taber (1998) and Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999, 
Section 5.2) on the properties and origin of this estimator.
 6. An alternative strategy would generate predicted individual impacts by including 
interaction terms between baseline covariates and the treatment group dummy in 
an impact regression; see Barnow (1999) for an application.  
 7. Their earnings measure combines self-report data with data from Unemploy-
ment Insurance earnings records. For more details, see the discussion in Orr et al. 
(1996).
 8. Orr et al. (1996, Exhibits 5.19 and 5.20) also present subgroup impact estimates 
for male and female youth. As expected given the small sample sizes, they fi nd no 
statistically signifi cant differences in estimated impacts among the subgroups.
 9. To improve statistical effi ciency, we use the inverse of the robust standard errors 
from the corresponding impact estimation as weights in each regression. Recall 
that the dependent variable here is the impact; its estimated standard error is thus 
an estimate of the variance of the error term for that impact, which represents one 
observation in our regression. Viewed in this way, the procedure amounts to doing 
weighted least squares in the presence of heteroskedasticity, where the extent of 
the heteroskedasticity is indicated by differences among subgroups in the esti-
mated standard errors of the impacts.
 10. We thank Tim Bartik of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research for 
providing us with copies of two of the unpublished papers.
 11. To see this, consider a simple case with two groups, A and B, two services, Class-
room Training (CT) and Job Search Assistance (JSA), and one short-run perfor-
mance measure, P. For group A, CT yields impact 100 and performance 20 while 
JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40. In contrast, for group B, CT yields 
impact 30 and performance 10 while JSA yields impact 40 and performance 40. 
Suppose further that without the performance management system, program staff 
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would maximize impacts by assigning group A to CT and group B to JSA. In 
contrast, with the performance management system, they maximize performance 
by assigning both A and B to JSA. Thus, the introduction of the performance stan-
dards system induces a substantial effi ciency loss. Unfortunately, our regression 
analysis applied to data collected from this imaginary program after the introduc-
tion of performance standards would not reveal the effi ciency loss. This follows 
from the fact that in the world with the performance standards system, the correla-
tion between subgroup mean impacts and subgroup performance equals zero.
 12. To see the issue, consider a simple example. In this example our program has just 
one service: CT. Among the applicants, some individuals have a (H)igh impact 
of CT because they get along well with the instructor, others would have a (L)ow 
impact because they do not. At the same time, applicants also differ in their job 
search behavior following CT. Some individuals, call them (F)ast, take the fi rst 
job they fi nd after completing CT while other individuals, call them (S)low, search 
longer but fi nd a higher paying job in the end, as standard search theory would 
predict. Together H/L and F/S defi ne four groups. Assume that these four groups 
each constitute one-quarter of the applicants and that the program has suffi cient 
resources to serve half of the applicants. To make the example concrete, we assign 
the following values: H-F individuals have impact 100 and performance 50, H-S 
individuals have impact 120 and performance 20, L-F individuals have impact 50 
and performance 50, and L-S applicants have impact 80 and performance 10. In 
a world without performance standards, caseworkers serve only H individuals, 
while in a world with performance standards, caseworkers serve only F individu-
als. In the applicant population, impact and performance outcomes have a negative 
correlation, indicating an effi ciency loss from selection into the program based on 
performance rather than impacts. In the participant population, impact and perfor-
mance have a zero correlation because, by construction, performance equals 50 
for all the participants regardless of their impact. This example clearly violates 
the assumption of the same relationship between impacts and performance among 
participants and applicants. It also demonstrates that failure of this assumption can 
lead to a misleading conclusion about the effi ciency effects of cream skimming 
and about whether short-term outcomes predict long-term impacts.
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